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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 In the spring of 2014, Globus Medical, Inc., a medical 
device company, terminated its relationship with one of its 
product distributors.  Several months later, in August 2014, 
Globus executives alerted shareholders that sales growth had 
slowed, attributed this decline in part to the decision to 
terminate its contract with the distributor, and revised 
Globus’s revenue guidance downward for fiscal year 2014.  
The price of Globus shares fell by approximately 18% the 
following day.  
 
 Globus shareholders contend the company and its 
executives violated the Securities Exchange Act and 
defrauded investors by failing to disclose the company’s 
decision to terminate the distributor contract and by issuing 
revenue projections that failed to account for this decision.  
The trial court dismissed the shareholders’ suit, and the 
shareholders appealed.  We will affirm.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
 A. Facts  
 
 Globus is a publicly traded medical device company 
that designs, develops, and sells musculoskeletal implants, 
particularly for individuals with spine disorders.  Globus 
relies on both in-house sales representatives and independent 
distributors to sell its products to surgeons and surgical staff 
nationwide.  Vortex Spine, LLC, was one of Globus’s 
independent distributors, serving as the exclusive distributor 
for Globus’s spine implant products in certain portions of 
Louisiana and Mississippi.    Vortex signed its initial 
Exclusive Distributorship Agreement with Globus in 2004, 
and the parties renewed the agreement in 2008 and 2010.  The 
2010 agreement was scheduled to expire on December 31, 
2013. 
 
 Globus’s statements and actions in the wake of the 
December 31, 2013, expiration of the agreement have become 
the focus of this case.  Plaintiffs allege that Globus decided to 
terminate its partnership with Vortex around the time of the 
expiration of the agreement.  This was in line with the 
company’s strategy to increase its reliance on in-house sales 
representatives in the hopes of controlling commission costs 
and strengthening its control over its sales team.  Nonetheless, 
Globus extended the existing distributorship agreement for 
four months—through April 2014—and allegedly told Vortex 
the companies would use this period to negotiate terms for a 
new distributorship agreement.  Plaintiffs contend Globus 
instead used this period to establish a new in-house sales 
position to cover the geographic territory being handled by 
Vortex. 
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 On February 26, 2014—in the midst of the period 
covered by the extension of the agreement with Vortex—
Globus Chief Financial Officer Richard A. Baron projected 
“sales in the range of $480 million to $486 million, earnings 
per fully diluted share of $0.90 to $0.92 per share” for fiscal 
year 2014 during an earnings conference call.  A51.  A few 
weeks later, on March 14, 2014, Globus filed its 2013 10-K 
with the Securities & Exchange Commission.  In a section of 
the 10-K titled “Risks Related to Our Business and Our 
Industry,” Globus cautioned, “If we are unable to maintain 
and expand our network of direct sales representatives and 
independent distributors, we may not be able to generate 
anticipated sales.”  A46.  The risk disclosure added: 
 
We face significant challenges and risks in 
managing our geographically dispersed 
distribution network and retaining the 
individuals who make up that network.  If any 
of our direct sales representatives were to leave 
us, or if any of our independent distributors 
were to cease to do business with us, our sales 
could be adversely affected.  Some of our 
independent distributors account for a 
significant portion of our sales volume, and if 
any such independent distributor were to cease 
to distribute our products, our sales could be 
adversely affected.  In such a situation, we may 
need to seek alternative independent distributors 
or increase our reliance on our direct sales 
representatives, which may not prevent our 
sales from being adversely affected. 
 
A47.  
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 Globus met with Vortex’s founder and manager on 
April 18, 2014.  Globus leadership notified him that Globus 
had designated a new in-house sales representative to handle 
distribution for the geographic territory covered by Vortex.  
Globus proposed a new agreement with Vortex which would 
require Vortex to turn over its customers to Globus in 
exchange for a royalty payment and would require Vortex’s 
sales representatives to become Globus employees.  Vortex 
rejected the proposed terms. 
 
 Approximately ten days later, on another earnings 
conference call, CFO Baron again projected Globus would 
achieve $480 to $486 million in sales, with $0.90 to $0.92 
earnings per fully diluted share for fiscal year 2014—
estimates identical to those he projected in February 2014.  
The next day, April 30, 2014, Globus filed with the SEC its 
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 
31, 2014.  In a section titled “Quantitative and Qualitative 
Disclosure About Market Risk,” Globus stated, “We have 
evaluated the information required under this item that was 
disclosed in our 2013 Annual Report on Form 10-K and there 
have been no significant changes to this information.”  A49–
50. 
 
 Months later, on August 5, 2014, Globus issued a press 
release announcing its results for the second fiscal quarter of 
2014 and revising its revenue guidance.  According to the 
release, Globus “now expect[ed] full year net sales to be in 
the range of $460 to $465 million” but added that its earnings 
per share guidance “remained unchanged.”  A53.  In an 
earnings conference call held the same day, Globus Chief 
Operating Officer David M. Demski explained that “domestic 
sales growth in the quarter was below our historical 
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standards” attributing this development, in part, to the fact 
that “early in the quarter we made the decision not to renew 
our existing contract with a significant U.S. distributor, 
negatively impacting our sales.”  A53.  Demski observed that 
the company “understood the risks to our short-term results.”  
A53.  Globus shares fell $4.05 per share (17.9%) in the wake 
of the revised revenue guidance to close at $18.51 per share 
on August 6, 2014.  Ultimately, at the fiscal year’s end, 
Globus announced it had achieved $474.4 million in sales, 
with earnings per share at $0.97—meaning sales for the fiscal 
year ultimately finished just 1.17% below the initial 
projection made in February 2014 and earnings per share 
exceeded the projection by 5.4%. 
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
 Plaintiff Mark Silverstein filed this action in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on September 29, 2015, on behalf of “all those 
who purchased or otherwise acquired Globus securities traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange [between February 26, 
2014 and August 5, 2014] and were damaged upon the 
revelation of the alleged corrective disclosure.”  A54. On 
January 14, 2015, the District Court granted the motion of 
Austin J. Williams to be appointed lead plaintiff as the person 
most capable of adequately representing the class.1  
                                              
1 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act amended the 
Securities Exchange Act to provide that “[n]ot later than 90 
days” after notice to shareholders of the pending securities 
action, “the court shall consider any motion made by a 
purported class member in response to the notice, . . . and 
shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the 
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 By stipulation of the parties, plaintiffs filed an 
Amended Complaint on February 19, 2016.  The Amended 
Complaint names as defendants Globus, Globus CEO David 
C. Paul, Globus CFO Richard A. Baron, Globus COO David 
M. Demski, and Globus Chief Accounting Officer Steven M. 
Payne. The Amended Complaint alleges the 2013 10-K, 2014 
1Q 10-Q, and related earnings calls violated §§ 10(b) and 
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated under that Act by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
 
   On March 28, 2016, Globus filed a motion to dismiss 
the Amended Complaint. The District Court granted that 
motion and dismissed all claims against all defendants by 
Memorandum and Order dated August 25, 2016. Plaintiff 
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court 
denied on September 12, 2016. This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under Section 27 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, and 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. We have jurisdiction over the 
appeal from a final order granting a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) under 28 U.S.C. § 
                                                                                                     
purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most 
capable of adequately representing the interests of class 
members[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). The statute 
provides a rebuttable presumption that the most adequate 
plaintiff is the person that “in the determination of the court, 
has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the 
class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(bb). 
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1291.  “We exercise plenary review over the order dismissing 
the complaint, as well as the District Court’s interpretation of 
securities law.” Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital 
Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 2006).  
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
 A. Legal Standard 
 
 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
prohibits any person “[t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission 
may prescribe . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
under the Exchange Act, makes it unlawful: 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person,  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
  
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  
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 To state a claim for relief under section 10(b), a 
plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that (1) 
the defendant made a materially false or 
misleading statement or omitted to state a 
material fact necessary to make a statement not 
misleading; (2) the defendant acted with 
scienter; and (3) the plaintiff’s reliance on the 
defendant’s misstatement caused him or her 
injury. 
  
Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
 
 All securities fraud claims are subject to Rule 9(b), 
which requires plaintiff to “state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(b).  In addition, the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) imposes two heightened pleading requirements 
above the normal Rule 12(b)(6) standard. First, “the 
complaint must specify each allegedly misleading statement, 
why the statement was misleading, and if an allegation is 
made on information and belief, all facts supporting that 
belief with particularity.” Institutional Investors Grp. v. 
Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)). Second, 
the complaint must “with respect to each act or omission 
alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with 
the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).  
Accordingly, “[f]ailure to meet the threshold pleading 
requirements demanded by [Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA] 
justifies dismissal apart from Rule 12(b)(6).”  Cal. Pub. 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 145. 
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 B. Application 
 
 Plaintiffs’ claims can be divided into two categories: 
challenges to historical statements, namely the risk 
disclosures found in Globus’s 2013 10-K and 2014 1Q 10-Q; 
and challenges to forward-looking statements, namely the 
sales and earnings projections made in the February and April 
earnings conference calls.  We address each category in turn. 
 
  1. Historical Statements 
 
 The District Court held that plaintiffs failed to plead 
actionable omissions from Globus’s risk disclosures because 
Globus had no duty to disclose either its decision to terminate 
its relationship with Vortex or the completed termination of 
that relationship.  Plaintiffs argue the District Court erred 
because the absence of that information rendered the risk 
disclosures materially misleading.  We disagree and conclude 
there was no duty to disclose.   
 
   “[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) do not create an 
affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information. 
Disclosure is required under these provisions only when 
necessary ‘to make . . . statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.’” 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44 (2011) 
(quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b)).  “Silence, absent a duty 
to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”  Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).  As we have 
previously held, “[e]ven non-disclosure of material 
information will not give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 
unless the defendant had an affirmative duty to disclose that 
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information.”  Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 285 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The duty to disclose arises “when there is insider 
trading, a statute requiring disclosure, or an inaccurate, 
incomplete or misleading prior disclosure.”  Id. at 285–86.   
 
 Plaintiffs contend Globus’s omission of its decision to 
terminate its relationship with Vortex falls into the final 
category because, without that information, Globus’s existing 
risk disclosures were inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading.  
Globus’s risk disclosures in the 2013 10-K and 2014 1Q 10-Q 
warned that the loss of an independent distributor could have 
a negative impact on sales—but it omitted to warn investors, 
plaintiffs argue, that Globus had in fact lost an independent 
distributor. 
 
 Once a company has chosen to speak on an issue—
even an issue it had no independent obligation to address—it 
cannot omit material facts related to that issue so as to make 
its disclosure misleading.  Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 
24 F.3d 480, 490–91 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[E]ncompassed within 
that general obligation [to speak truthfully] is also an 
obligation or ‘duty’ to communicate any additional or 
qualifying information, then known, the absence of which 
would render misleading that which was communicated.”) 
(internal citation omitted).  Consistent with this principle, 
courts are skeptical of companies treating as hypothetical in 
their disclosures risks that have already materialized.   
 
 For example, in In re Harman International Industries, 
Inc. Securities Litigation, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit considered a company—a 
manufacturer of information and entertainment systems for 
automobiles—that touted its considerable inventory of 
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personal navigational devices (PNDs) while also warning 
generally that its sales depended on its ability to develop new 
products in a competitive market.  791 F.3d 90, 103–04 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015).  But the company did not disclose to investors that 
much of its PND inventory had already been rendered 
obsolete by new technology, forcing the company to cut its 
prices and reducing its sales revenue.  The District of 
Columbia Circuit suggested the company’s general warnings 
about product obsolescence could be misleading and 
emphasized, “there is an important difference between 
warning that something ‘might’ occur and that something 
‘actually had’ occurred.”  Id. at 103. 
 
 Similarly, in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, a government intelligence and surveillance 
contractor was sued after its revenue dropped by 25% 
following the cancellation of several contracts.  Berson v. 
Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).  The 
contracts at issue were subject to “stop-work” orders—which 
immediately stop payment to the company and often signal 
eventual cancellation of the contract—but the company 
included revenue from these contracts as part of its “backlog” 
of work the company had contracted to do, but had not yet 
performed.  The company warned that “future changes in 
delivery schedules and cancellations of orders” might mean 
sales for the year would not match the full backlog value, but 
the court found the company’s representations could be 
misleading.  Id. at 986.  The company’s warning, the court 
held, “speaks entirely of as-yet-unrealized risks and 
contingencies.  Nothing alerts the reader that some of these 
risks may already have come to fruition, and that what the 
company refers to as backlog includes work that is 
substantially delayed and at serious risk of being cancelled 
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altogether.” Id.; see also Siricusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, 
Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding actionable 
a statement that “speaks about the risks of product liability 
claims in the abstract, with no indication that the risk ‘may 
already have come to fruition.’”), aff’d 563 U.S. 27 (2011).  
 
 We agree that a company may be liable under Section 
10b for misleading investors when it describes as hypothetical 
a risk that has already come to fruition.  But this is not such a 
case.  In the 2013 10-K filed in March 2014, and incorporated 
by reference in the 2014 1Q 10-Q a month later, Globus 
warned, “if any of our independent distributors were to cease 
to do business with us, our sales could be adversely affected.”  
A47.  The risk actually warned of is the risk of adverse effects 
on sales—not simply the loss of independent distributors 
generally.  Accordingly, the risk at issue only materialized—
triggering Globus’s duty to disclose—if sales were adversely 
affected at the time the risk disclosures were made. 
 
 Plaintiffs have not plead that Globus’s sales were 
adversely affected by the decision to terminate Vortex at the 
time the risk disclosures were made.  The 2013 10-K was 
filed in March 2014, while Vortex was still distributing 
Globus’s products under the four-month extension of the 
existing distributorship agreement.  Nothing in the Amended 
Complaint suggests sales had decreased at that time.  The 
2014 1Q 10-Q was filed on April 30, 2014—less than two 
weeks after Vortex rejected Globus’s proposed terms for a 
new agreement.  Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts sufficient to 
show that Globus’s sales were adversely affected within that 
short window.  To the contrary, plaintiffs allege Globus had 
spent months preparing to end its relationship with Vortex 
and had an in-house sales representative prepared to take over 
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the territory previously covered by Vortex.  Nothing in the 
Amended Complaint permits the inference that Globus was 
aware of adverse effects on sales prior to the August 5, 2014, 
earnings conference call when the company revised its 
revenue projections.    
 
 Accordingly, this case is unlike the materialization of 
risk cases cited by plaintiffs, in which the adverse effects at 
issue had in fact been realized.  In Harman, at the time of the 
company’s general warnings about the need to develop new, 
competitive products, the obsolescence of its PNDs had 
already led to a reduction in prices and missed sales targets.  
791 F.3d at 107 (“by April, inventory obsolescence was 
becoming a problem; by September it had fully materialized 
into a serious problem effecting Company revenues”) 
(internal citations omitted).  Similarly, in Berson, the court 
noted that stop-work orders—like those that were not 
disclosed by the company in conjunction with its backlog 
report—“immediately interrupt the company’s revenue 
stream.”2  527 F.3d at 986.  Accordingly, the circumstances in 
                                              
2 In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Securities & Derivative Litigation 
is also illustrative.  986 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
Facebook’s risk disclosures warned that increased mobile 
usage might negatively affect the company’s revenue, but the 
court found the plaintiffs had sufficiently plead that the 
disclosure was misleading.  It explained, “Facebook’s 
Registration Statement did not disclose that increased mobile 
usage and the Company’s product decisions had already had a 
negative impact on the Company’s revenues and revenue 
growth. The Company’s purported risk warnings 
misleadingly represented that this revenue cut was merely 
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these cases differ from the circumstances here because 
plaintiffs have not plead that Globus was already 
experiencing an adverse financial impact at the time of the 
risk disclosures. 
 
 Nor have plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that a drop in 
sales was inevitable.  Plaintiffs suggest Globus should have 
known that its sales would be adversely affected by the 
company’s decision to end its relationship with Vortex based 
on the company’s experience with “distributor turnover” in 
2010.  Plaintiffs note that defendant Paul acknowledged that 
it took “almost two years” to get Globus back to the same 
level financially in the wake of that turnover.  A48–49.  But 
the Amended Complaint provides no details about the 
“distributor turnover” in 2010, including how many 
distributors were involved, whether the distributor or 
distributors involved were of comparable significance to 
Globus’s sales as Vortex was, whether the turnover was 
expected, and what, if any, contingencies were in place at the 
time of the distributor turnover.  Absent this information, we 
cannot conclude that Globus and its executives should have 
expected a similar financial impact from its decision to 
terminate its relationship with Vortex as from the 2010 
“distributor turnover.” 
 
 Because plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead that 
the risk about which Globus warned—the risk of adverse 
effects on sales as a result of the loss of a single independent 
distributor—had actually materialized at the time of either the 
2013 10-K or the 2014 1Q 10-Q, Globus had no duty to 
                                                                                                     
possible when, in fact, it had already materialized.”  Id. at 
516. 
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disclose its decision to terminate its relationship with Vortex, 
and the risk disclosures were not materially misleading.  We 
will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the claims based 
on historical statements. 
 
  2. Forward-Looking Statements 
 
 Plaintiffs contend Globus and its executives violated 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by issuing revenue projections 
in February and April 2014 that failed to account for the 
company’s decision to terminate its relationship with Vortex.  
The District Court dismissed these claims because it found 
that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to show that the 
revenue projections were false when made, or in the 
alternative, the challenged statements were entitled to the 
protection of PSLRA’s safe harbor. 
 
   a. Falsity  
 Because plaintiffs allege that the revenue projections at 
issue were false or misleading, their allegations must meet the 
“[e]xacting pleading requirements” of the PSLRA.  City of 
Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 
2014) (alteration in original, internal quotations omitted).  “In 
addition to requiring plaintiffs to specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading, . . . the PSLRA directs 
plaintiffs to specify ‘the reason or reasons why the statement 
is misleading.’” Calif. Pub. Emps., 394 F.3d at 145 (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1)).  These “true facts” allegations 
cannot rely exclusively on hindsight, but must be sufficient to 
show that the challenged statements were “actionably 
unsound when made.”  See In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1430 (3d Cir. 1997); see also In re 
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NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1330 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“To be actionable, a statement or omission must have been 
misleading at the time it was made; liability cannot be 
imposed on the basis of subsequent events.”).  Accordingly, 
“it is not enough merely to identify a forward-looking 
statement and assert as a general matter that the statement 
was made without a reasonable basis.”  Burlington, 114 F.3d 
at 1429.  Instead, plaintiffs were required to plead factual 
allegations that show the projections were “made with either 
(1) an inadequate consideration of the available data or (2) the 
use of unsound forecasting methodology.”  Id.   
 
 In this case, plaintiffs’ allegations hinge on their 
conclusory assertion that Globus’s “announced forecast 
incorporated Vortex’s projected sales figures for the 
remainder of the 2014 fiscal year.”  A51.  To support this 
claim, plaintiffs draw numerous inferences based on 
statements made by Globus executives during the August 
2014 call explaining the revisions to the revenue guidance.  
First, they cite defendant Baron’s statement that “the decision 
not to renew the distributor, and the impact to pricing will 
affect our top line expectations.  We now expect full year 
revenue to be in the range of $460 million to $465 million.” 
A327.  This statement, they contend, shows Globus must 
have incorporated Vortex revenue into their earlier 
projections—otherwise they would not have needed to revise 
the revenue forecast downward.  Further, because defendant 
Baron responded, “I don’t think we should comment on that,” 
when asked whether the revenue guidance would have been 
revised “if not for the distributor issue,” A336, plaintiffs 
contend we should infer the loss of Vortex’s revenue 
accounted for the full $20 million downward revision. 
 We agree with the District Court that these allegations 
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fall short of the exacting pleading standards imposed by the 
PSLRA.  Plaintiffs were required to plead “true facts” 
sufficient to show the February and April revenue projections 
were false or misleading when made.  But instead of citing 
contemporaneous sources to show Globus knowingly 
incorporated Vortex revenue into those projections, plaintiffs 
rely on conjecture based on subsequent events.  This is 
insufficient.  See In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1330 (“[L]iability 
cannot be imposed on the basis of subsequent events.”); see 
also Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1430 (“Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
contains a number of vague factual assertions regarding the 
period prior to November 1, 1993, but plaintiffs have failed to 
link any of these allegations to their claim that the November 
1 forecast was actionably unsound when made.”).   
 
 Even assuming plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions were 
sufficient to infer that Globus’s projections incorporated some 
revenue from Vortex, the Amended Complaint would still 
fail.  Plaintiffs fail to plead specific facts regarding the 
amount of sales revenue from Vortex projected by Globus; 
how far short of the projections Vortex sales ultimately fell; 
and, how significant the shortfall was in the context of 
Globus’s sales overall.  Without these facts, plaintiffs do not 
sufficiently plead that, at the time the projections were made, 
Globus failed to adequately account for the imminent change 
in distributorship and any resulting effect on sales.  Absent 
these details, plaintiffs have done nothing more than “assert 
as a general matter that the [revenue projections were] made 
without a reasonable basis.”  Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1429.   
 
 Further, at the end of the fiscal year, Globus achieved 
$474.4 million in sales—just less than its initial projection of 
$480 million to $486 million—and earnings of $0.97 per 
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share—compared to an initial projection of $0.90 to $0.92.  In 
other words, Globus exceeded its projections for earnings per 
fully diluted share and missed its initial revenue projection by 
just 1.17%.  While the ultimate touchstone is whether the 
projections were false or misleading when made, plaintiffs’ 
claim that the projections were impossible to achieve is 
undermined by the fact that the company ultimately 
substantially achieved the challenged projections.  See Avaya, 
564 F.3d at 266–67.  On these facts, we conclude plaintiffs 
have not adequately pleaded the revenue projections were 
false or misleading when made. 
 
   b. Safe Harbor  
 In the alternative, like the trial court, we find the 
challenged revenue projections are entitled to protection 
under the PSLRA’s safe harbor.  The statute “immunizes 
from liability any forward-looking statement, provided that: 
the statement is identified as such and accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary language; or is immaterial; or the 
plaintiff fails to show the statement was made with actual 
knowledge of its falsehood.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 254 (citing 
15 U.S.C. § 78u–5(c)).  We find plaintiffs have failed to 
adequately plead that the revenue projections were made with 
actual knowledge of falsehood. 
 
 The PSLRA requires plaintiffs in securities class 
actions to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2).  To meet this standard, “an 
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or 
reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as 
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”  Tellabs, 
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Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 
(2007).   
 
 Plaintiffs primarily point to three facts in asking us to 
infer actual knowledge of falsity on the part of Globus and its 
executives: (1) during the August 5, 2014, call explaining the 
revisions to the sales projections, COO Demski stated that the 
company “understood the risks to our short-term results” 
when it terminated its relationship with Vortex, A53; (2) 
during that same call, CEO Paul and CFO Baron 
acknowledged that they recalled Globus’s 2010 experience 
with “distributor turnover” and the two-year period it took to 
get the company “back to where [it was],” A45–46; and (3) 
the nature of the market for spinal implant products and the 
importance of goodwill between salespeople and customers.  
  
 From these facts, it may be plausible to infer that 
Globus knew or should have known that ending its 
relationship with Vortex could have some effect on its sales.  
But, as the District Court correctly noted, actual knowledge 
that sales from one source might decrease is not the same as 
actual knowledge that the company’s overall sales projections 
are false. Silverstein v. Globus Medical, Inc., No. 15-5386, 
2016 WL 4478826, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2016) (“But 
simply knowing that the loss of a distributor may cause a drop 
in sales does not mean that Globus failed to account for this 
drop in its projections.”).  Plaintiffs have not pleaded any 
facts to support their claim that Globus incorporated 
anticipated revenue from Vortex in its projections.  Indeed, 
given plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Globus’s extensive, 
months-long planning for the end of its relationship with 
Vortex—including the company’s broad strategy to transition 
its sales force from independent distributors to in-house sales 
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representatives and the fact that a new in-house sales 
representative was in place to take over Vortex’s geographic 
territory before the relationship was terminated—the more 
plausible inference from the Amended Complaint is that 
Globus accounted for the change in strategy when it devised 
its sales projections for the year.  Globus’s later revision of 
those projections does not sufficiently show that Globus knew 
the projections were false when made—particularly when 
Globus ultimately achieved sales for the fiscal year within 
1.17% of the original, challenged projection and exceeded its 
projection for earnings per share.  Absent facts giving rise to 
a strong inference of scienter, Globus’s forward-looking 
revenue projections are entitled to the protection of the 
PSLRA safe harbor.      
 
  3. Section 20(a) Claims 
 
 Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act permits 
plaintiffs to bring a cause of action against individuals who 
control a corporation that has violated Section 10(b).  15 
U.S.C. § 78t(a).  “[L]iability under Section 20(a) is derivative 
of an underlying violation of Section 10(b) by the controlled 
person.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 252.  Because we affirm the 
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under Section 10(b), we also 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of their Section 20(a) 
claims. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For these reasons, plaintiffs have failed to adequately 
plead any violation of the Securities Act on the part of Globus 
or its controlling officers.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of all claims. 
